Joe Nye's been making the rounds lately, promoting his latest book. Here he's talking to Al Jazeera's Riz Khan, covering issues and concepts that are just much too familiar to our class :)
Enjoy!
Showing posts with label public diplomacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public diplomacy. Show all posts
April 14, 2011
April 3, 2011
PD Quotes of the Week
Researching on Turkey's international broadcasting, I came across a great piece by Al Ahram from a year ago. Discussing the various aspects of Turkey's (then) new Arabic-language broadcaster, the article concludes:
"It is still unclear where Turkey's "soft-power" in the Arab world is heading. Erdogan is the only high profile politician in the region who criticises Israel -- Turkey's ally -- and prioritises the Palestinian question in his discourse on the Middle East. In a way this indirectly feeds Arab nationalism, which places the Palestinian question at the centre of its concerns. Ironically, Arab nationalism emerged in response to the Ottoman Empire. The dynamics might be too complex to decipher at this stage but this much is clear: the Turks have arrived."
Given all the events since, and especially the most recent "revolutions" in the MENA region, it is particularly interesting to follow Turkey's role in it all: providing guidance, leadership, as well as initiative and truly trying to live up to its projected image of being a "bridge between the East and the West."
Another interesting piece on a similar subject - that of Turkish Soap Operas - was published by Foreign Policy around the same time. Here's an excerpt:
Another interesting piece on a similar subject - that of Turkish Soap Operas - was published by Foreign Policy around the same time. Here's an excerpt:
"Four-hundred years after a nasty occupation of Arab land by the forefathers of these young Turks, the Arab world is embracing Turkey, opening its living rooms and flocking around their television sets to watch over 140 episodes of second-rate Turkish soap operas that don't even do well in Turkey itself.
If only the sultans knew that it could be done on the cheap, they could have dispatched these handsome men and beautiful women and assembled them to conquer hearts and minds in the Arab world on their behalves, saving the treasury endless amount of cash."
Great point. Indeed, modern technologies and the unavoidable transnational relationships that they have created, allow such interaction to take place. Of special note, of course, is the fact that the Arabs despised everything "Turkish" (OK, rather Ottoman, which was still associated with "Turkish") for centuries. The only explanations that come to my mind are:
- Time (but of course) and all the various developments and transformations that Turkey itself has undergone.
- Shared cultural heritage: unfortunately, there's no escaping it.
Public diplomacy implications? I guess it provides a great example, demonstrating yet again that unless there is a true change in attitude and behavior towards a people (i.e. by an actor itself) and unless there is common ground to communicate upon, achieving success in public diplomacy objectives will be very difficult, if not impossible. The source of communication and its perceived credibility on the subject matter. Nothing new, of course.
March 24, 2011
DirecTV Commercials: Russia, You Have a Problem
Reposting from Global Chaos, yet again.
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Not that it's anything new... and yet, it shows - once again - that Russia, along with several other former Communist/Socialist states, has a major image problem in the U.S. On numerous occasions before, I have discussed these stereotype issues on this blog, and this new DirecTV commercial only reiterates it all. (The commercial might have been around for quite a while, but since I do not own a TV - quite fortunately - I would ask for your understanding on the delayed response.)
Here's the "new" commercial, which seems to have been launched this month:
I have no words to explain how it is supposed to be related - if at all - to promoting a satellite TV service. But that aside: what images does it convey and what stereotypes of Russia, and Russians, is it playing on?
In a series of papers, Ivan Katchanovski has demonstrated the negative representation of Russia and some other former Soviet countries in American news coverage, as well as in popular culture. His analysis of a set of Hollywood movies has shown that:
I couldn't not think of this excerpt when I saw this commercial "masterpiece".
Why is it a problem?
In his work on "imagology", William Chew has correctly pointed out that:
Just like on many occasions before, such representations only reinforce the not-so-positive images of Russia held by so many Americans, cashing in on long-held stereotypes. Unfortunately, the multitude of the people who will see this commercial will - most probably - never see a Russian ballet performance, for example, which will only help to perpetuate such negative attitudes.
This is a major issue to be addressed by Russia as a part of its public diplomacy effort. Of course, many would find this ingenious piece funny, and would argue that it works as great advertising... (for who, one might ask?) However, I wonder what the reaction would have been, had "the Russian" been replaced by an Israeli, for instance. (This is a rhetorical question, by the way. And yet, I would appreciate insights, if you're willing to share.)
In short, some more food for thought...
And just for your reference, here's the hideous "prequel", that has been on air for about a year now (to the best of my knowledge, that is).
I know you're dying to get DirecTV now, eh?
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Not that it's anything new... and yet, it shows - once again - that Russia, along with several other former Communist/Socialist states, has a major image problem in the U.S. On numerous occasions before, I have discussed these stereotype issues on this blog, and this new DirecTV commercial only reiterates it all. (The commercial might have been around for quite a while, but since I do not own a TV - quite fortunately - I would ask for your understanding on the delayed response.)
Here's the "new" commercial, which seems to have been launched this month:
I have no words to explain how it is supposed to be related - if at all - to promoting a satellite TV service. But that aside: what images does it convey and what stereotypes of Russia, and Russians, is it playing on?
In a series of papers, Ivan Katchanovski has demonstrated the negative representation of Russia and some other former Soviet countries in American news coverage, as well as in popular culture. His analysis of a set of Hollywood movies has shown that:
"most of the movies, incorrectly present Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as economically and technologically backward, extremely anti-American and anti-Semitic countries, which have pervasive “Russian mafia” and widespread female prostitution."
I couldn't not think of this excerpt when I saw this commercial "masterpiece".
Why is it a problem?
In his work on "imagology", William Chew has correctly pointed out that:
"[...] national stereotypes are generally rationalised by the spector as based on a supposedly objective reality, but [they also] tend to be omnipresent in comics, cinema, literature, computer games, public media, jokes and the like, and are constantly though not consciously invoked to confirm one’s auto-image, one’s national identity. Once established, they remain latent in the individual consciousness, or collective mentality, to be called upon when needed."
Just like on many occasions before, such representations only reinforce the not-so-positive images of Russia held by so many Americans, cashing in on long-held stereotypes. Unfortunately, the multitude of the people who will see this commercial will - most probably - never see a Russian ballet performance, for example, which will only help to perpetuate such negative attitudes.
This is a major issue to be addressed by Russia as a part of its public diplomacy effort. Of course, many would find this ingenious piece funny, and would argue that it works as great advertising... (for who, one might ask?) However, I wonder what the reaction would have been, had "the Russian" been replaced by an Israeli, for instance. (This is a rhetorical question, by the way. And yet, I would appreciate insights, if you're willing to share.)
In short, some more food for thought...
And just for your reference, here's the hideous "prequel", that has been on air for about a year now (to the best of my knowledge, that is).
I know you're dying to get DirecTV now, eh?
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March 19, 2011
Zogby: Americans Still Don't Get the Arabs
Here's a super-interesting discussion I came across recently with James Zogby on Americans' misunderstanding of the Middle East region, its people, and its consequent public diplomacy implications.
Some of the highlights include:
Some of the highlights include:
- Zogby: “I felt that with President Obama having the best of intentions, closing that gap was going to be a must, first. I don’t think public diplomacy begins with our selling of our message overseas as much as it begins with our understanding the region that we want to sell our message to, at home. We don’t understand the Arab world, so we talk at them, and not to them, not with them.” --> interesting case of differentiation between "transmission" and "ritual" views of communication, and the implications of confusion...
- Mentions the age-old concern about the lack of education on the region and the acquisition of that knowledge from the popular culture & Hollywood, instead.
- Clear disconnect between the issues that Arabs themselves pointed out as important/significant for them, and those that are promoted and even "pushed" by the U.S. --> such public diplomacy only backfires.
Yet, he still has some hope. Perhaps we should do, too.
March 7, 2011
Al Jazeera on Clinton's Information War
Here's an "Inside Story" episode on Clinton's remarks first aired on Al Jazeera on March 5.
Although a great discussion, it is somewhat frustrating to hear the guests discussing Clinton's "confusion" of international and domestic media, while her testimony was aimed precisely at that: convincing the Congressmen of the need to keep the financing of foreign broadcasting, because the American domestic media, and more importantly, because its pop culture (remember the Afghan General story?) cannot do the all-important job of public diplomacy...
Strongly recommend watching through it all!
Although a great discussion, it is somewhat frustrating to hear the guests discussing Clinton's "confusion" of international and domestic media, while her testimony was aimed precisely at that: convincing the Congressmen of the need to keep the financing of foreign broadcasting, because the American domestic media, and more importantly, because its pop culture (remember the Afghan General story?) cannot do the all-important job of public diplomacy...
Strongly recommend watching through it all!
Labels:
Al Jazeera,
international broadcasting,
international politics,
media,
public diplomacy,
U.S.
February 27, 2011
Just a little... Chaos!
This is reposted from Global Chaos.
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A highlight this week: as all those who follow the Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review already know, Chris Dufour (a.k.a. Du4) was at our Public Diplomacy class today, for an AWESOME discussion on public diplomacy, strategic communication, and strategic coordination, or rather, lack thereof. After all the recent arguments and discussions on the subject of "social media revolutions", the absence of such, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy, it was refreshing to hear Du4's perspective. I guess I would categorize him as a "cyber realist", who did spell it out in one sentence: "There is no such thing as a 'Twitter Revolution'; there is a revolution that uses Twitter as a tool."
Well, that's inspiring!
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A highlight this week: as all those who follow the Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review already know, Chris Dufour (a.k.a. Du4) was at our Public Diplomacy class today, for an AWESOME discussion on public diplomacy, strategic communication, and strategic coordination, or rather, lack thereof. After all the recent arguments and discussions on the subject of "social media revolutions", the absence of such, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy, it was refreshing to hear Du4's perspective. I guess I would categorize him as a "cyber realist", who did spell it out in one sentence: "There is no such thing as a 'Twitter Revolution'; there is a revolution that uses Twitter as a tool."
Thank you. Gladwell and Shirky can calm down, now.
Courtesy of Denver Post.
He also talked about the lack of interagency coordination and the absence of a coherent strategy in the U.S. public diplomacy. Certainly, not a new concern; however, ever more urgent, as the State Department (though, not only) seems to be rapidly enhancing its "new media" fetish. After all, in the current context not only does the "right hand" of the public diplomacy "structure" have to know what the "left hand" is doing (which, apparently, happens rarely), but it might also have to keep track of all that is blogged, tweeted, Facebooked, YouTube-d, flicker-ed, etc...
Impossible? Perhaps. Well, then, can the "open source" approach to public diplomacy be a viable alternative? Not so, Du4 says, unless there is a "grand strategy" behind it all. Somewhat reflects Zaharna's argument, with which I tend to agree. Yes, social networking is a good tool for enhancing people-to-people communication (P2P - the term seems so old now!), encouraging conversations, and promoting what Shirky called the "environmental" approach to social media.
"Twitterhea", from HubSpot Blog.
Yet, it cannot and should not be the only "approach" to the U.S. public diplomacy, no matter how "cheap" or "easily available". All that is good, particularly in terms of communicating the value of "plurality" that America seems to have patented (many different voices, multiple messages...); but it's only good insofar as it complements a well-coordinated, multi-dimensional and multi-faceted strategy, with a time frame that ranges from "immediate" (remember the "now media"?) to the "very-long-term" (and here, I mean decades). Some of it can be outsourced, of course, whether to "professionals" or the public itself; but with many in the world now getting the "public diplomacy" (traditional style) fever, completely discarding the notion of a coherent public diplomacy strategy (please note, I am not referring to the tools, here), might prove disastrous for U.S. interests, especially in the mid-to-long-run.
And to highlight what Du4 himself referred to: in the end of the day, credibility is what matters, especially for a government. And certainly, the number of tweeters or tweets, or the YouTube video uploads will not automatically bring that about, as long as the source itself is seen as lacking credibility or trustworthiness.
Today, I also came across this new, very weird Russia Today TV promo. Thought I should share here, too.
I don't know what RT is trying to convey through this "ad", but seems to be attempting to respond to criticism of it essentially being Moscow's propaganda tool and incorporate some key public diplomacy "concepts" such as "truth" or "listening".
Hmm... Don't know about you, but to me this just looks ridiculous (yes, yet again!). The tone, the people featured, the approach... And most of all, the prominence of the word "propaganda", which, in English, has strong negative connotations and does not bring about any "truth"- or "listening"-related associations to mind.
And to leave you with, perhaps, the most memorable quote from Du4, tonight:
"Find the passion groups in what you're passionate about, and engage with them."
Well, that's inspiring!
February 16, 2011
"Internet Freedom" (or, the "Military-Twitter Complex")
Another cross-post this week.
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The U.S. should declare February 15 as its official "Internet Freedom Day": meetings, statements, reports... All in one day and all saying basically the same thing: "Open Internet is good" and "The U.S. should/will do more to promote 'Internet Freedom' technologies as a core part of its 21st Century Foreign Policy." Dealing with these very same subjects in my classes and watching the events in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere unfold live on the Internet, makes me all the more ambivalent about these issues.
Funnily enough, just a couple of weeks ago we read the piece, “From hegemony to soft power: Implications of a conceptual change” by Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos (from Soft Power and US Foreign Policy : Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives), where they made a very strong case in critiquing Nye's approach as mostly "an apology" or a justification for U.S. global hegemony. With the above discussion in mind, I cannot help but point out the apparent hegemonic streak in this hype about the "New Media" and "Open Internet".
Firstly, the administration has chosen not to criticize its allies in the region (Bahrain or Yemen, for example), while making sure to emphasize their "concern" about the clampdown by the Iranian authorities. Then, there is the increasingly apparent equation of "Internet Freedom" (which the U.S. claims is a fundamental right, en par with other universal human rights) with U.S. interests, which not only hinders the acceptance of the issue by the governments in question, but also runs the risk of actually discrediting this supposedly "sacrosanct" foundation of the "21st Century Public Diplomacy".
To quote James Harkin:
I will leave you with a tweet from what seems to be a mock tweeter on behalf of @Henry Kissinger [Courtesy of Dr. John Brown]:
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P.S. - Just saw this new post by Katie Dowd on DipNote: "Opinion Space 3.0 Launches on State.Gov." Will try to "try out" this "universe of viewpoints and ideas" and share impressions, some time.
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The U.S. should declare February 15 as its official "Internet Freedom Day": meetings, statements, reports... All in one day and all saying basically the same thing: "Open Internet is good" and "The U.S. should/will do more to promote 'Internet Freedom' technologies as a core part of its 21st Century Foreign Policy." Dealing with these very same subjects in my classes and watching the events in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere unfold live on the Internet, makes me all the more ambivalent about these issues.
[Please note: no indication, whatsoever, where these statistics came from. More importantly, the video seems to be focusing primarily on the U.S., and therefore, the suggested "impact" is quite questionable at an international level.]
But before I go any further, I think a disclaimer is in order. Two, actually:
1 - I had started gathering a list of articles/videos from prominent news media organizations about the "New/Social Media and/or Twitter Revolution" that has "spread like wildfire all across the Middle East." My initial intent was to suggest several counter-arguments on this blog. But as the events developed rapidly (and still are), I simply couldn't keep up with the pace and the sheer volume of information and discussions. Add to that, all that came out over the past two days... In short, there will, probably, be too many chaotic thoughts in this post, helping the blog live up to its name.
2 - As I said, I am ambivalent on the subjects involved. All I intend to do is look at some alternative views, raise some questions, hopefully start a discussion, and most importantly - help myself find some answers.
Here is the bouquet of yesterday's events:
- Secretary Clinton's second "Internet Freedom" speech at GWU.
- Followed by a global "Interactive Web Chat" with Alec Ross (DoS Senior Adviser for Innovation) and Dan Baer (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor).
- A panel on the U.S. Global Engagement in the New Media Era, organized by the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report on Public Diplomacy: "Another U.S. Deficit - China and America - Public Diplomacy in the Age of the Internet."
- President Obama's Press Conference (included a conversation on Egypt)
Internet Freedom, or rather, "21st Century Statecraft" seems to have been one of the core issues (if not the core issue) of the U.S. foreign policy promoted Secretary Clinton over the past several years. Being such a broad "concept", it seems to encompass issues ranging from free-market promotion and intellectual-rights' protection, to Twitter and the "free marketplace of ideas". All with the noble cause of spreading liberty, freedom of information, expression, and most importantly, democracy.
Image courtesy of DipNote.
First, there is China. No, rather, first: there is the "China Scare". With mentions in almost every major international affairs-related statement or report, especially when it comes to the Internet, the U.S. has made it clear that China is its primary "concern" in the world. With that in mind, how can one read the persistent U.S. attempts to pressure China to "open its markets" and to open itself up to further information penetration? After all, the U.S. primary concern here - quite naturally - is its interest, while from China's perspective, such a move would mean a threat to its own national interests. Oh, and loss of profit.
To quote Foreign Policy's Josh Rogin, commenting on the Senate report:
"Not only is Beijing using its tight control over the Internet to shield the population from news and information related to government behavior, it is now exporting its censorship technologies to other repressive countries, including Iran, Cuba, and Belarus, Lugar's report stated."
Clinton, too, dedicated quite some time to China, as well as Iran, in her speech yesterday. But in addition to the usual list of "issues", this time she also talked about Wikileaks. Although the Secretary tried making some arguments to support the U.S. Government's position, the fact that she immediately turned to discussing freedom and transparency, did significant damage to the credibility of these arguments. Especially so yesterday, after Washington ordered Twitter to disclose the details of private accounts of several individuals involved in the case.
Then there is the whole "New Media Revolution" angle... Although I do acknowledge the role that technology played - initially - in helping some of the protesters organize and mobilize support, it was largely a non-factor in the actual course of the events. If anything, the social media has helped some of the people on the ground to get the story out to the world. But so did Al Jazeera.
To quote Phil Seib:
"First, let’s be clear that this was the Egyptian Revolution, not the “Facebook Revolution” or the “Twitter Revolution.” Events of the past few weeks belong wholly to spirit of the Egyptian people, not technology. And although it was built on democratic aspirations, this was not a revolution that drew any inspiration from the United States."
I was closely following the discussion on Twitter throughout some of the days of the "standoff", and it did, indeed, seem like the conversation was going on largely among people outside of the country. There was perhaps a couple of dozen of key tweeters - especially those tweeting in English - who would "say" something or post a link, which would then be carried on to the "Western" tweet-o-sphere, where it would be retweeted, recycled, re-edited, reposted... The perfect information cascade.
To demonstrate it better, here's a "tweet-o-graph" by Kovas Boguta, showing the "most influential" tweeters on "#Egypt", as the events unfolded:
If interested, you can actually access the super-high resolution format of this image here.
The description of it reads:
"[The network map] is based on the Twitter activity [of the pro-democracy movement], capturing the freedom of expression and association that is possible in that medium, and which is representative of a new collective consciousness taking form. [...] The map is arranged to place individuals near the individuals they influence, and factions near the factions they influence. The color is based on the language they tweet in -- a choice that itself can be meaningful, and clearly separates different strata of society."
Although great, this work has major shortcomings, mostly because of the lack of clarity of Boguta's methodology. And yet, even if we take it at face value, this image shows the much larger blue (i.e. English language) tail, which suggests that the majority of the conversation happened either outside of the country, or was tweeted from inside but with the foreign public in mind. This is also a great visualization of the cascading effect.
But as it has been emphasized many times before, information cascades not only help spread information, but they also promote the spread of unverified and often untrue information (see this Foreign Policy post, for instance), and are associated with unquestioned mass (or "herd") behavior. In a sense that's what happened with the "Social Media in Egypt" story, too.
Not only was it a common result of such tweet-o-mania or the need of the mainstream/traditional media to make the story relevant to the American public, but it also fit - perfectly - into the current dominant foreign policy framework promoted by Clinton. This, in turn, helps to further perpetuate such faith in "Twitter" and "Facebook" - and here, I use "faith" in its literal sense.
In case you missed the news, social media companies are attracting billions of dollars in investments, so much so that there is now talk of a possible "Social Media Bubble", similar to the "dot-com bubble" of the early 2000s. Add to that all the money from the State Department for the development of various software, tools, and platforms. But beyond that, it is also important to point out all the support these companies and corporations have been getting from the U.S. Government at an inter-state level, as well as the inevitably obvious interconnections ("interlocking directorates" of some sort... or, to put in somewhat other terms, the "revolving door") between various individuals involved in the story, in one way or another.
Image courtesy of Zero Anthropology.
For example: the by-now-renowned Wael Ghonim, who credited Facebook for ousting Mubarak, is himself a Google Inc. employee, and managed to make good use of the circumstances and attention, to direct even more hype toward the "social media revolution" story. Another example: Jared Cohen, a former DoS Policy Planning staff official and DoS' "Social Media guru", has moved to Google's mysterious "Google Ideas" think-tank since September 2010. As much as I tried finding an official website for it, or any official information, the most substantial description was this excerpt from Cohen's "farewell" letter posted on Politico:
"Google Ideas will combine the models of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, a think tank, and a private sector company, with resources to implement. In this sense, Google Ideas will be a think/do tank that strives to bring together diverse perspectives from multiple industries to generate new ideas, approaches and solutions to security, social, economic and political challenges in the world."
I am not implying a conspiracy. Rather, I am suggesting a scenario where these "social media gurus" are making use of the situation to add hype and substance to the story, and thus increase the overall value of their collective "new media" market. In short: cash in.
And lastly, there is the issue of the American "soft"/"smart" power. Joe Nye was quick to respond to the Egyptian events. His conclusion:
"Revolutions are not new, nor are transnational contagion or non-state actors who play a key role in world affairs.
What is new -- and what we saw manifested in Egypt -- is the speed of communication and the technological empowerment of a wider range of actors. An information world will require new policies that combine hard and soft power resources into smart power strategies. That is the larger lesson of the revolution in Egypt."
Funnily enough, just a couple of weeks ago we read the piece, “From hegemony to soft power: Implications of a conceptual change” by Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos (from Soft Power and US Foreign Policy : Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives), where they made a very strong case in critiquing Nye's approach as mostly "an apology" or a justification for U.S. global hegemony. With the above discussion in mind, I cannot help but point out the apparent hegemonic streak in this hype about the "New Media" and "Open Internet".
Image courtesy of Aaron Riddle.
Firstly, the administration has chosen not to criticize its allies in the region (Bahrain or Yemen, for example), while making sure to emphasize their "concern" about the clampdown by the Iranian authorities. Then, there is the increasingly apparent equation of "Internet Freedom" (which the U.S. claims is a fundamental right, en par with other universal human rights) with U.S. interests, which not only hinders the acceptance of the issue by the governments in question, but also runs the risk of actually discrediting this supposedly "sacrosanct" foundation of the "21st Century Public Diplomacy".
To quote James Harkin:
"For big American internet companies like Google and Twitter, the danger is that their interests come to be too closely defined with those of the American government: that they’re seen to be smuggling in statecraft under the guise of delivering technology. In the conspiracy mills of the Middle East, campaigns for internet freedom are denounced as cover for America’s broader agenda, the stalking horse for a shady new military-Twitter complex."
I will leave you with a tweet from what seems to be a mock tweeter on behalf of @Henry Kissinger [Courtesy of Dr. John Brown]:
"Diplomacy has changed so much. Today our diplomats tweet their messages to the public. In my day, we dropped them from 10,000 feet."
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P.S. - Just saw this new post by Katie Dowd on DipNote: "Opinion Space 3.0 Launches on State.Gov." Will try to "try out" this "universe of viewpoints and ideas" and share impressions, some time.
Labels:
China,
Egypt,
international politics,
Internet,
new media,
public diplomacy,
US Foreign Policy
February 14, 2011
On Russian "Kultura", Ballet, PD, & Stereotypes
Cross-posted from Global Chaos.
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If you haven't heard yet, Russia's renowned Mariinsky Ballet was in town last week, performing Adolphe Adam's "Giselle". Certainly, an occasion not to be missed! We braved the cold and the somehow prohibitively expensive ticket prices to enjoy two hours of "high culture" on Tuesday night... which, I should say, I am very happy about!
Of course, given my (perhaps biased) unparalleled admiration for Khatchaturian when it comes to ballet, I should not be trying to share "comparative" impressions of "Giselle", especially since the period and the genre are completely different. So I will express my great appreciation of Mariinsky performers' technique and exuberance (oh, and the costumes! beautiful!), and my sincere hope that I will get to see another performance by them some time soon.
This week I also had the great opportunity of hearing PD blogger-extraordinaire and former FSO Dr. John Brown talk about his work as a Cultural Attaché in Eastern Europe and later Russia (he was among the distinguished guests at our PD class this week!). In his talk, he put a special emphasis on the striking differences he saw in the importance of high culture in the region, and the contrasting disregard for it by Americans. If interested, you can watch (and read) his thoughts on the subject from a little more than a year ago: a similar presentation, which he gave at AU's First Cultural Diplomacy Conference (November 2009). Very insightful, and oh so true!
(Before I go any further, I wanted to share the following compilation of Tchaikovsky's greatest works, by the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra)
Louis Clark - Hooked on Tchaikovsky
To sum up some of Dr. Brown's key points:
- "Seeking the meaning of Russia outside of culture is pointless." Culture lies at the core of "Russianness."
- While, as a contrast, Americans define themselves essentially in terms of ideas: democracy, dignity, liberty, etc.
- This also impacts the way these nations see their contribution "to the civilization of mankind": Russia in terms of its high culture, while America in terms of ideals like democracy and free-market economy.
- Certainly, has major repercussions for the way they conceptualize public and, especially, cultural diplomacy. Can sometimes go disastrously wrong.
I will take the liberty to take this "train of thought" a step further and suggest that perhaps the "exclusiveness" of high culture is not perceived as "democratic" enough by Americans, which also helps explain the underlying general disapproval and dislike of initiatives that involve "high culture" in one way or another. Yet, as R.S. Zaharna says, public and cultural diplomacy need an "in-awareness" approach, if they are to have an impact - i.e. they have to resonate with the other culture, appealing to its ideals, values and interests.
According to Dr. Brown, American public diplomacy has largely failed to do that, especially when it comes to cultures such as the Russian or the Chinese, for whom their own "high culture" and great heritage are of paramount significance. Yet, I should say that the Russians (although the Chinese, too) have not learned that very same lesson themselves, in the sense of finding the right "values" to appeal to through their own public diplomacy. And here I will go back to ballet, which I can confidently say, is perhaps one of the few exceptions to this rule.
The tickets to "Giselle" sold out within days almost a month in advance (especially the more affordable ones), the hall was packed, and although I heard much more Russian and Chinese than I normally would on the streets of Washington, I also saw many Americans, quite a few of them with their children! Obviously, the Russian ballet has not lost its charm. However, it is still very limited in its reach, and as much as I dislike saying it, Russia needs to invest in (the production and export of) appealing pop culture, too.
But before I get into more detail on that, I wanted to point out that Russia Today TV had - smartly - been featuring Mariisnky on their website for days, now. They also proudly hosted the following piece, revealing the theater's plans "to seduce the Americans" while on this tour. Fair enough. I think those who had the opportunity to see it, were indeed seduced. But what about the vast majority who didn't? And/or never will? A prominent popular culture is indispensable in this sense, especially when operating in a multi-media environment where attention spans are extremely short, while innovation and progress seem to be valued much more than age and recognition.
Very select few are generally familiar with the Russian "pop culture" scene outside of Russia itself (and, certainly, the former Soviet/Socialist space), unless of course an artist or a movie make it to international contests, such as the case with t.A.T.u. or the "Night Watch". And although the Russian so-called "estrada", as well as its movies, TV shows, radio programs, etc. have come a long way over the years in terms of "pop quality", they cannot even begin to rival American or European ones, especially internationally.
Funnily enough, Russia Today TV does not provide any programming of this kind at all. The only thing I have come across so far is this "Moscow Out" episode from last April. I thought I'd share it with you here:
Oh well... (Can we go back to the ballet, now, please?!)
This said, I will end by returning to Dr. Brown's reflections. As he described (quite rightly, I believe), throughout the Cold War, the American pop culture was like a "forbidden fruit" for the Russian people (and especially, for the intelligentsia). However, during the 90's, "[...] as the Russians started consuming more and more of this forbidden fruit, they got indigestion." He said he had never seen so many bad American movies in his life, as in the 90's in Russia: they flooded the Russian (and post-Soviet) "cultural space", inevitably creating a negative and fairly misplaced image of America. Meanwhile, the American government was oblivious to this problem.
---
If you haven't heard yet, Russia's renowned Mariinsky Ballet was in town last week, performing Adolphe Adam's "Giselle". Certainly, an occasion not to be missed! We braved the cold and the somehow prohibitively expensive ticket prices to enjoy two hours of "high culture" on Tuesday night... which, I should say, I am very happy about!
Image courtesy of New York Times.
This week I also had the great opportunity of hearing PD blogger-extraordinaire and former FSO Dr. John Brown talk about his work as a Cultural Attaché in Eastern Europe and later Russia (he was among the distinguished guests at our PD class this week!). In his talk, he put a special emphasis on the striking differences he saw in the importance of high culture in the region, and the contrasting disregard for it by Americans. If interested, you can watch (and read) his thoughts on the subject from a little more than a year ago: a similar presentation, which he gave at AU's First Cultural Diplomacy Conference (November 2009). Very insightful, and oh so true!
(Before I go any further, I wanted to share the following compilation of Tchaikovsky's greatest works, by the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra)
Louis Clark - Hooked on Tchaikovsky
To sum up some of Dr. Brown's key points:
- "Seeking the meaning of Russia outside of culture is pointless." Culture lies at the core of "Russianness."
- While, as a contrast, Americans define themselves essentially in terms of ideas: democracy, dignity, liberty, etc.
- This also impacts the way these nations see their contribution "to the civilization of mankind": Russia in terms of its high culture, while America in terms of ideals like democracy and free-market economy.
- Certainly, has major repercussions for the way they conceptualize public and, especially, cultural diplomacy. Can sometimes go disastrously wrong.
I will take the liberty to take this "train of thought" a step further and suggest that perhaps the "exclusiveness" of high culture is not perceived as "democratic" enough by Americans, which also helps explain the underlying general disapproval and dislike of initiatives that involve "high culture" in one way or another. Yet, as R.S. Zaharna says, public and cultural diplomacy need an "in-awareness" approach, if they are to have an impact - i.e. they have to resonate with the other culture, appealing to its ideals, values and interests.
According to Dr. Brown, American public diplomacy has largely failed to do that, especially when it comes to cultures such as the Russian or the Chinese, for whom their own "high culture" and great heritage are of paramount significance. Yet, I should say that the Russians (although the Chinese, too) have not learned that very same lesson themselves, in the sense of finding the right "values" to appeal to through their own public diplomacy. And here I will go back to ballet, which I can confidently say, is perhaps one of the few exceptions to this rule.
The tickets to "Giselle" sold out within days almost a month in advance (especially the more affordable ones), the hall was packed, and although I heard much more Russian and Chinese than I normally would on the streets of Washington, I also saw many Americans, quite a few of them with their children! Obviously, the Russian ballet has not lost its charm. However, it is still very limited in its reach, and as much as I dislike saying it, Russia needs to invest in (the production and export of) appealing pop culture, too.
Image courtesy of Russian Washington-Baltimore.
Very select few are generally familiar with the Russian "pop culture" scene outside of Russia itself (and, certainly, the former Soviet/Socialist space), unless of course an artist or a movie make it to international contests, such as the case with t.A.T.u. or the "Night Watch". And although the Russian so-called "estrada", as well as its movies, TV shows, radio programs, etc. have come a long way over the years in terms of "pop quality", they cannot even begin to rival American or European ones, especially internationally.
Funnily enough, Russia Today TV does not provide any programming of this kind at all. The only thing I have come across so far is this "Moscow Out" episode from last April. I thought I'd share it with you here:
Oh well... (Can we go back to the ballet, now, please?!)
This said, I will end by returning to Dr. Brown's reflections. As he described (quite rightly, I believe), throughout the Cold War, the American pop culture was like a "forbidden fruit" for the Russian people (and especially, for the intelligentsia). However, during the 90's, "[...] as the Russians started consuming more and more of this forbidden fruit, they got indigestion." He said he had never seen so many bad American movies in his life, as in the 90's in Russia: they flooded the Russian (and post-Soviet) "cultural space", inevitably creating a negative and fairly misplaced image of America. Meanwhile, the American government was oblivious to this problem.
February 7, 2011
"Obama 2.0": Two Years On
Since this week we had been focusing on "soft power", "American hegemony" around the world, and its role in international politics in general, I thought this is a very timely program to bring to your attention. (Cross-posted from Global Chaos.)
--
January ended a week ago: another month over, which also means another Empire episode on Al Jazeera English (yes, I'm a devout follower as you probably noticed by now). This latest episode was shot in Washington, DC, as a panel discussion at GW University - featuring noteworthy speakers: Ralph Nader, Roger Hodge, Stefan Halper, and As'ad Abu Khalil (the "Angry Arab") - and focusing on the evaluation of President Obama's foreign policy performance two years after taking office.
In "Obama 2.0", the discussion focuses on American "soft power" (or rather, the lack thereof) around the world, its sources, weaknesses, and the reasons for its failure. Here is the discussion in full:
(Please note that the program was shot some time mid-January, and was aired on January 24 for the first time - much earlier than Egypt erupted. That is why the references to North African "revolutions" come only in terms of Tunisia. Nonetheless, the conversation does touch upon the volatility of the region and all the hypocrisy perceived by the local Arab publics.)
Yet again, if you don't have the time (for whatever reason) to sit through the entire piece, I would suggest you look through the following segments that were - sort of - the starting points for the discussion. The first one focuses on "The Imperial Presidency":
Interesting, and very relevant to the discussions we have been having in the public diplomacy class this week. The program makes the point that Obama was indeed a great speaker - especially compared to his predecessor - and when it came to rallying the international public, he was certainly much more successful in getting the message across and inspiring hope beyond the American borders.
Yet, two years on, very few of his foreign policy promises actually materialized, resulting not just in the same old disillusionment, but perhaps even in net loss in terms of improving perceptions abroad ( --> the greater the expectations, the greater the perceived dissatisfaction, and thus, much greater disappointment). After all, he can make very eloquent and charismatic speeches, but what people really want to see are actions, and these don't seem to be coming about. Not yet, at least.
Can't help but refer back to my favorite concept that serves (in my opinion) as one of the core foundations of public diplomacy: diplomacy of deed. Instead, this discussion points to "the gap between words and deeds", and how, over time, the U.S. is losing its so-called "soft power". Oh, and certainly: they could not pass on the hypocrisy of selective democracy promotion/enforcement, which has been demonstrating itself only too well over the past several weeks.
Watching this program now could not have been more timely: after a week of reading on soft power, hegemony, and the predominance of American values and structures around the world, such formulations and framing by Al Jazeera seem to make quite a lot of sense. (But hey, let's not forget their own perspective, and their own, so-called agenda. That granted, both, the channel itself, and Marwan Bishara especially, need special recognition for raising these questions in the first place, and more importantly, for making it in a pretty legitimate and "backed-up" way.)
The second segment deals with "Obama's Wars" - the peculiar similarities and differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, American tactics, the losses in terms of "hearts and minds", and the implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy (featuring Jeremy Scahill and Matt Hoh).
Certainly, there is a lot of emphasis on the military spending, as well as the "Counterinsurgency" program, which some on the panel contend, is not just not working, but is fueling further disillusionment and extremism among the locals. Here, it would be appropriate to go back to a term I really like - cultural intelligence, or "CultInt". This term truly captures the conceptual incoherence of the effort, I think: garnering support from the local population by combining "culture" (broadly defined) with "intelligence" (no, it's not referring to competence, but rather, information gathering). In short, studying the "target public" from within so as to be able to use various elements of its culture against itself. And it is also here that one can observe the very thin line where "soft power" easily transforms into "hegemony", if not outright "coercion". (Remember "Avatar", the movie?)
It is difficult not to go into the ethical implications of this effort. But even if that is ignored "for the sake of national security", the issue still begs the question: what is national security? I thought the fact that most of the insecurity comes from negative perceptions of the U.S. among certain parts of the international public was recognized ten years ago. But then it seems to take a little longer for policymakers to fully comprehend that perceptions are also directly related to actions ("public diplomacy of deed", remember?).
Seeing all this obsession with rhetoric and words in the U.S. media (but also the society as a whole), I can't help but ask whether this obsession also projects itself into the foreign policy domain. If so, it is unfortunate, because two more years from now the Arab (and Muslim) public will not be going to re-read and re-analyze every single phrase in every speech Obama made and what it represents about his intent (unless, of course, they use it to evaluate his actions). Rather, they will be counting their number of dead, as well as the millions (and in some cases, billions) of military aid the U.S. gives to their authoritarian and corrupt leaders.
(Yes, some may ask why Obama's personal effort is so decisive. But then, being the democratically-elected President and the Commander-in-Chief of the military, he is also the "Persuader-In-Chief", speaking on behalf of all of America.)
With this in mind, it seems like Egypt does indeed present the major public diplomacy challenge for Obama (if not the biggest foreign policy problem). There has been a lot of attention as to what the White House (or anyone else from the administration) will or will not say. And yet, what will matter in the end is what his administration actually does, whether overtly or not (apologies to all the speech writers!).
--
January ended a week ago: another month over, which also means another Empire episode on Al Jazeera English (yes, I'm a devout follower as you probably noticed by now). This latest episode was shot in Washington, DC, as a panel discussion at GW University - featuring noteworthy speakers: Ralph Nader, Roger Hodge, Stefan Halper, and As'ad Abu Khalil (the "Angry Arab") - and focusing on the evaluation of President Obama's foreign policy performance two years after taking office.
In "Obama 2.0", the discussion focuses on American "soft power" (or rather, the lack thereof) around the world, its sources, weaknesses, and the reasons for its failure. Here is the discussion in full:
(Please note that the program was shot some time mid-January, and was aired on January 24 for the first time - much earlier than Egypt erupted. That is why the references to North African "revolutions" come only in terms of Tunisia. Nonetheless, the conversation does touch upon the volatility of the region and all the hypocrisy perceived by the local Arab publics.)
Yet again, if you don't have the time (for whatever reason) to sit through the entire piece, I would suggest you look through the following segments that were - sort of - the starting points for the discussion. The first one focuses on "The Imperial Presidency":
Interesting, and very relevant to the discussions we have been having in the public diplomacy class this week. The program makes the point that Obama was indeed a great speaker - especially compared to his predecessor - and when it came to rallying the international public, he was certainly much more successful in getting the message across and inspiring hope beyond the American borders.
Yet, two years on, very few of his foreign policy promises actually materialized, resulting not just in the same old disillusionment, but perhaps even in net loss in terms of improving perceptions abroad ( --> the greater the expectations, the greater the perceived dissatisfaction, and thus, much greater disappointment). After all, he can make very eloquent and charismatic speeches, but what people really want to see are actions, and these don't seem to be coming about. Not yet, at least.
Can't help but refer back to my favorite concept that serves (in my opinion) as one of the core foundations of public diplomacy: diplomacy of deed. Instead, this discussion points to "the gap between words and deeds", and how, over time, the U.S. is losing its so-called "soft power". Oh, and certainly: they could not pass on the hypocrisy of selective democracy promotion/enforcement, which has been demonstrating itself only too well over the past several weeks.
Watching this program now could not have been more timely: after a week of reading on soft power, hegemony, and the predominance of American values and structures around the world, such formulations and framing by Al Jazeera seem to make quite a lot of sense. (But hey, let's not forget their own perspective, and their own, so-called agenda. That granted, both, the channel itself, and Marwan Bishara especially, need special recognition for raising these questions in the first place, and more importantly, for making it in a pretty legitimate and "backed-up" way.)
The second segment deals with "Obama's Wars" - the peculiar similarities and differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, American tactics, the losses in terms of "hearts and minds", and the implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy (featuring Jeremy Scahill and Matt Hoh).
Certainly, there is a lot of emphasis on the military spending, as well as the "Counterinsurgency" program, which some on the panel contend, is not just not working, but is fueling further disillusionment and extremism among the locals. Here, it would be appropriate to go back to a term I really like - cultural intelligence, or "CultInt". This term truly captures the conceptual incoherence of the effort, I think: garnering support from the local population by combining "culture" (broadly defined) with "intelligence" (no, it's not referring to competence, but rather, information gathering). In short, studying the "target public" from within so as to be able to use various elements of its culture against itself. And it is also here that one can observe the very thin line where "soft power" easily transforms into "hegemony", if not outright "coercion". (Remember "Avatar", the movie?)
It is difficult not to go into the ethical implications of this effort. But even if that is ignored "for the sake of national security", the issue still begs the question: what is national security? I thought the fact that most of the insecurity comes from negative perceptions of the U.S. among certain parts of the international public was recognized ten years ago. But then it seems to take a little longer for policymakers to fully comprehend that perceptions are also directly related to actions ("public diplomacy of deed", remember?).
Visualization of President Obama's Cairo Speech on June 4, 2009 (in Wordle).
(Yes, some may ask why Obama's personal effort is so decisive. But then, being the democratically-elected President and the Commander-in-Chief of the military, he is also the "Persuader-In-Chief", speaking on behalf of all of America.)
With this in mind, it seems like Egypt does indeed present the major public diplomacy challenge for Obama (if not the biggest foreign policy problem). There has been a lot of attention as to what the White House (or anyone else from the administration) will or will not say. And yet, what will matter in the end is what his administration actually does, whether overtly or not (apologies to all the speech writers!).
Labels:
Al Jazeera,
Egypt,
hegemony,
international politics,
Middle East,
public diplomacy,
soft power,
United States
January 31, 2011
More on Egypt (Part III)
(Cross-posted from Global Chaos)
Those of you regularly stopping by Global Chaos know that I've been watching the developments in Egypt closely. With a "march of millions" planned for Tuesday and Mubarak seemingly making "in-advance concessions" (promising that the army will not shoot at the protesters and trying to start talks with the opposition), it seems like the momentum is not dying down. Yet, it is important to note that Mubarak is obviously not planning on leaving, while the people are determined to go beyond just a simple government "reshuffle".
With such a crisis on hand and all the mounting international pressure, one would think that the Egyptian authorities would put some serious effort into trying to manage the story and the perceptions abroad. Needless to say, they are failing miserably.
Firstly, of course, there's the domestic side of the info management. Having shut down essentially all communication networks - including the Internet and mobile services - the government also closed down the Al Jazeera bureau in Cairo, revoked all AJ reporters' licenses, and even briefly detained six of their journalists on Sunday. (Kudos to State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley who devoted 140 characters earlier today to condemn this move by the Egyptian authorities, on Twitter.) They had blocked Al Jazeera's broadcasts in the country earlier (as had, reportedly, several other countries in the region), by which they had hoped to break the enthusiasm of the protesters. Obviously, they were wrong, and if anything, this move only shows the significance of Al Jazeera's reporting.
Instead, the Egyptian State TV offered various "alternative" news, such as the swearing in of the new government, captured here by CBS.
Yet, perhaps the most prominent ridiculousness by the Egyptian State TV happened back on Friday, at the height of the initial protests. While Al Jazeera was broadcasting live pictures of tens (hundreds?) of thousands gathered downtown Cairo, the State TV was showing a laser show at Cairo Tower. (If I were to tweet this, it would certainly deserve the "#epicfail" hashtag...!)
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to Mubarak's impotence. For example, he can always rely on Fox News or Netanyahu to sell his own side of the story to the American public...
It's noteworthy that there have been cases, in the past, where lobbyists have dropped their clients over major political crises. Would all these companies do the same now, though? Would they truly stand up for the protection of all the values and principles America has been so enthusiastically promoting all these years?
Those of you regularly stopping by Global Chaos know that I've been watching the developments in Egypt closely. With a "march of millions" planned for Tuesday and Mubarak seemingly making "in-advance concessions" (promising that the army will not shoot at the protesters and trying to start talks with the opposition), it seems like the momentum is not dying down. Yet, it is important to note that Mubarak is obviously not planning on leaving, while the people are determined to go beyond just a simple government "reshuffle".
Tahrir Square, January 31. Courtesy of Foreign Policy Magazine.
With such a crisis on hand and all the mounting international pressure, one would think that the Egyptian authorities would put some serious effort into trying to manage the story and the perceptions abroad. Needless to say, they are failing miserably.
Firstly, of course, there's the domestic side of the info management. Having shut down essentially all communication networks - including the Internet and mobile services - the government also closed down the Al Jazeera bureau in Cairo, revoked all AJ reporters' licenses, and even briefly detained six of their journalists on Sunday. (Kudos to State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley who devoted 140 characters earlier today to condemn this move by the Egyptian authorities, on Twitter.) They had blocked Al Jazeera's broadcasts in the country earlier (as had, reportedly, several other countries in the region), by which they had hoped to break the enthusiasm of the protesters. Obviously, they were wrong, and if anything, this move only shows the significance of Al Jazeera's reporting.
Instead, the Egyptian State TV offered various "alternative" news, such as the swearing in of the new government, captured here by CBS.
Yet, perhaps the most prominent ridiculousness by the Egyptian State TV happened back on Friday, at the height of the initial protests. While Al Jazeera was broadcasting live pictures of tens (hundreds?) of thousands gathered downtown Cairo, the State TV was showing a laser show at Cairo Tower. (If I were to tweet this, it would certainly deserve the "#epicfail" hashtag...!)
Image from YFrog via @OctaviaNasr.
Furthermore, today morning Al Jazeera mentioned in their live coverage that the State TV also broadcast some pictures of the mass demonstrations, while claiming that they are pro-Mubarak. Do they really think their own people are that stupid? It also seems like he has bought into all the media-and-tweet hype regarding the situation, ignoring the spontaneous nature of the uprising. Yes, without all these communications and information it might be difficult to coordinate and organize better, but the fact that mass demonstrations are planned for tomorrow (Tuesday) too, shows that people will get to the streets anyway.
But that aside, let's look at Mubarak's current "public diplomacy" disaster. Shutting down Al Jazeera's Cairo bureau on Sunday was essentially meant to prevent the network from broadcasting abroad. After all, it has become the source to turn to "on all things Egypt" these days (especially its English-language programming), revealing all that is going on in Egypt for real and framing headlines and perceptions all over the world. Not only doesn't Egypt have an international English-language broadcaster of its own (to at least try and put its own version of the story out there), but it cannot even start hoping that it could ever manage to beat the reach and the credibility enjoyed by Al Jazeera.
Image courtesy of Foreign Policy Magazine.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to Mubarak's impotence. For example, he can always rely on Fox News or Netanyahu to sell his own side of the story to the American public...
More importantly, there are several major lobbying and PR companies, that had been long employed by the Egyptian government, to do the "DC-job" on its behalf. Of course, here we are not really talking about public diplomacy per se, and yet, influencing congressional decision-makers themselves constitutes an essential part of the country's image-management efforts. Salon's "War Room" featured an article several days ago detailing some of these long-standing agreements, which were later laid out - in graphics - by Muckety.
It's noteworthy that there have been cases, in the past, where lobbyists have dropped their clients over major political crises. Would all these companies do the same now, though? Would they truly stand up for the protection of all the values and principles America has been so enthusiastically promoting all these years?
The Mubarak regime might have deep ties with the American government, no matter who heads the administration; and yet, at the moment, it seems like the Egyptian people's public diplomacy - whether within the "New Public Diplomacy" concept, or just that promoted by Al Jazeera (still reporting, even if "illegally") - is working better than the government's one in terms of winning public support internationally.
And just to leave you with a laugh that went viral (rather, resurfaced) earlier today:
Note the location of "Egypt". From a Fox News cast two years ago. (Why am I not surprised?!) Read more on Huffington Post.
UPDATE [2/1/2011; 8:00AM]: Some of the latest images and updates from Al Jazeera. Seems like even the telephone services are down now, and yet the flow on people in Cairo has not stopped.
Labels:
Egypt,
propaganda,
public diplomacy,
US Foreign Policy
January 30, 2011
Egypt in turmoil: a test of U.S. public diplomacy
With Egypt in turmoil and Tunisia facing an uncertain political future, the United States is facing the greatest challenge to its public diplomacy in the Arab world. For its strategic interests and to keep oil flowing, the U.S. has always supported dictators, autocrats and monarchs in the Middle East, much to the chagrin of common people.
Hosni Mubarak, who seems to be on his last leg, ruled Egypt for no less than 28 years with full support from the U.S. (Egypt has been the largest U.S. aid recipient after Israel.) Started in Tunisia earlier this month, people's uprising is giving sleepless nights to monarchs and dictators in the Arab world.
But the U.S. seems nonplussed because it always cultivated relations with Arab rulers instead of Arab people. President Barack Obama's earlier response was that "the U.S. is not taking sides in Egypt" (as quoted by NPR) when Mubarack still seemed to be strong. However, now that the dictator's fall seems fairly certain, the U.S. president says the people of Egypt have the rights to peaceful assembly and association, to free speech and to determine their own fate.
In other words, now the U.S. stands by the people of Egypt, not Mubarak on whom Washington always counted. Mubarak and others like him in Middle East have never allowed opposition to organize and groom an alternative leadership. That is the reason that in Tunisia things are murky, Egypt is facing uncertainty while the rest of Arab countries are having their fingers crossed.
Some commentators call it "people's revolution" unfolding, but who are going to replace the dictators? The only opposition force in Middle East are Islamists/fundamentalists apart from army. This is the challenge that the U.S. is facing. If Islamic Brotherhood swings into action to lead anti-Mubarak uprising, how the U.S. will respond? If army topples the Mubarak regime and impose martial law, what options the U.S. has in such a scenario? If elections are held and these Islamists come to power, how the U.S. will react?
To stave off anti-American feelings in the streets of Middle East, the U.S. has to use its "soft power" by living up to its political values and letting not its foreign policy undercut its cultural values. Now that anti-Americanism is at its peak in Muslim world, it is because the U.S. compromised its public diplomacy for strategic and political expediencies. There has been contradictions between its foreign policy and other tools of its public diplomacy namely cultural and political values.
Crises also bring opportunities in their wake, and the U.S. has now this rare opportunity to stand by the Arab people to chose their future.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8291645/Egypt-crisis-Mubarak-under-pressure-from-West-as-lawlessness-takes-hold.html
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamas-statement-egypt_537615.html
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2045085,00.html
Hosni Mubarak, who seems to be on his last leg, ruled Egypt for no less than 28 years with full support from the U.S. (Egypt has been the largest U.S. aid recipient after Israel.) Started in Tunisia earlier this month, people's uprising is giving sleepless nights to monarchs and dictators in the Arab world.
But the U.S. seems nonplussed because it always cultivated relations with Arab rulers instead of Arab people. President Barack Obama's earlier response was that "the U.S. is not taking sides in Egypt" (as quoted by NPR) when Mubarack still seemed to be strong. However, now that the dictator's fall seems fairly certain, the U.S. president says the people of Egypt have the rights to peaceful assembly and association, to free speech and to determine their own fate.
In other words, now the U.S. stands by the people of Egypt, not Mubarak on whom Washington always counted. Mubarak and others like him in Middle East have never allowed opposition to organize and groom an alternative leadership. That is the reason that in Tunisia things are murky, Egypt is facing uncertainty while the rest of Arab countries are having their fingers crossed.
Some commentators call it "people's revolution" unfolding, but who are going to replace the dictators? The only opposition force in Middle East are Islamists/fundamentalists apart from army. This is the challenge that the U.S. is facing. If Islamic Brotherhood swings into action to lead anti-Mubarak uprising, how the U.S. will respond? If army topples the Mubarak regime and impose martial law, what options the U.S. has in such a scenario? If elections are held and these Islamists come to power, how the U.S. will react?
To stave off anti-American feelings in the streets of Middle East, the U.S. has to use its "soft power" by living up to its political values and letting not its foreign policy undercut its cultural values. Now that anti-Americanism is at its peak in Muslim world, it is because the U.S. compromised its public diplomacy for strategic and political expediencies. There has been contradictions between its foreign policy and other tools of its public diplomacy namely cultural and political values.
Crises also bring opportunities in their wake, and the U.S. has now this rare opportunity to stand by the Arab people to chose their future.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8291645/Egypt-crisis-Mubarak-under-pressure-from-West-as-lawlessness-takes-hold.html
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamas-statement-egypt_537615.html
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2045085,00.html
January 21, 2011
PD or Propaganda?
Back to "class blogging," again! This time, we'll be exploring the domain of public diplomacy with Dr. Craig Hayden. Given the subject and my interest, most (if not all) of my posts will inevitably be cross-posted on Global Chaos: a disclaimer I felt I should state before we embarked on our grand, semester-long group endeavor.
To begin, I'll just share a post from today, hoping to start a discussion. Would appreciate thoughts, insights, and comments!
--
As we started the new class on Public Diplomacy this semester, the first couple of sessions and readings were - of course - devoted to the discussion of the (hard-to-define and often ambiguous) differences between "propaganda" and "public diplomacy". I won't be reproducing the entire discussion here. Instead, I wanted to raise the question (and hope to get insights from the readers of this blog): which category would this Voice of America program belong to?
I never watch or follow VOA Persian (primarily due to my non-existent Farsi skills), and I heard about Parazit only recently. Yet, it seems to have gotten quite a lot of attention from mainstream American media lately, so much so that Jon Stewart himself ("the Prophet" of satire, as Parazit's creators called him!) hosted them at his Daily Show last night.
There's no denying, political humor and satire is a whole different animal. The case of Iran itself, is very... difficult, for the lack of a better word. The limitations on freedoms and the strict regulation of speech make the production of such programming within Iran practically impossible. So yes, in that sense VOA Persian is "breaking" taboos and raising legitimate questions.
But the way it is done, the language and symbolism used, as well as its method - the appeal to emotions and indirect influence through humor - seem controversial to me. Moreover, one should not forget the fact that this is a part of a country's international broadcasting, paid for by American taxpayers and targeting the public of the very same government the show so vehemently attacks.
That is why, as much as I appreciate VOA's work in bringing uncensored and more objective information to the Iranian people, I'm finding it hard to define such programming in any terms that do not involve references to propaganda, in some shape or form. After all, the difference between propaganda and public diplomacy is based on the "element of morality" and, more importantly, on one's perspective. The former aims to tell people what to think, while the latter supposedly informs, raises questions, and suggests what the audience should think about.
So, what do you think?
To begin, I'll just share a post from today, hoping to start a discussion. Would appreciate thoughts, insights, and comments!
--
As we started the new class on Public Diplomacy this semester, the first couple of sessions and readings were - of course - devoted to the discussion of the (hard-to-define and often ambiguous) differences between "propaganda" and "public diplomacy". I won't be reproducing the entire discussion here. Instead, I wanted to raise the question (and hope to get insights from the readers of this blog): which category would this Voice of America program belong to?
Courtesy of The Washington Post, December 31, 2010
I never watch or follow VOA Persian (primarily due to my non-existent Farsi skills), and I heard about Parazit only recently. Yet, it seems to have gotten quite a lot of attention from mainstream American media lately, so much so that Jon Stewart himself ("the Prophet" of satire, as Parazit's creators called him!) hosted them at his Daily Show last night.
There's no denying, political humor and satire is a whole different animal. The case of Iran itself, is very... difficult, for the lack of a better word. The limitations on freedoms and the strict regulation of speech make the production of such programming within Iran practically impossible. So yes, in that sense VOA Persian is "breaking" taboos and raising legitimate questions.
But the way it is done, the language and symbolism used, as well as its method - the appeal to emotions and indirect influence through humor - seem controversial to me. Moreover, one should not forget the fact that this is a part of a country's international broadcasting, paid for by American taxpayers and targeting the public of the very same government the show so vehemently attacks.
That is why, as much as I appreciate VOA's work in bringing uncensored and more objective information to the Iranian people, I'm finding it hard to define such programming in any terms that do not involve references to propaganda, in some shape or form. After all, the difference between propaganda and public diplomacy is based on the "element of morality" and, more importantly, on one's perspective. The former aims to tell people what to think, while the latter supposedly informs, raises questions, and suggests what the audience should think about.
So, what do you think?
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